State of Utah v. Corinee Skidmore : Brief of Appellee by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2000
State of Utah v. Corinee Skidmore : Brief of
Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Jeffrey T. Colemere; Assistnat Attorney General; Mark L Shurtleff; Attorney General; Bruce G.
Ward; Attorneys for Appellee.
D. Bruce Oliver; Attorney for Appellant.
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Utah v. Skidmore, No. 20000714 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2000).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/2864
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/ Appellee, 
Case No. 20000719-CA 
CORINNE SKIDMORE, Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
APPEAL FROM A SENTENCE FOR POSSESSION OF A 
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE WITH INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE IN A 
DRUG-FREE ZONE, A FIRST DEGREE FELONY, IN VIOLATION OF 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-8 (Supp. 2001); IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT COURT IN CACHE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, THE 
HONORABLE THOMAS L. WILLMORE PRESIDING 
D. BRUCE OLIVER 
D. Bruce Oliver, P.C. 
180 South 300 West, Suite 210 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1490 
JEFFREY T. COLEMERE (8527) 
Assistant Attorney General 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF (4666) 
Utah Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
PO BOX 140854 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854 
BRUCE G.WARD (7666) 
Deputy Cache County Attorney 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
Case No. 20000719-CA 
v. 
CORINNE SKIDMORE, Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
APPEAL FROM A SENTENCE FOR POSSESSION OF A 
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE WITH INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE IN A 
DRUG-FREE ZONE, A FIRST DEGREE FELONY, IN VIOLATION OF 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-8 (Supp. 2001); IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT COURT IN CACHE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, THE 
HONORABLE THOMAS L. WILLMORE PRESIDING 
D. BRUCE OLIVER 
D. Bruce Oliver, P.C. 
180 South 300 West, Suite 210 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1490 
JEFFREY T. COLEMERE (8527) 
Assistant Attorney General 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF (4666) 
Utah Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
PO BOX 140854 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854 
BRUCE G. WARD (7666) 
Deputy Cache County Attorney 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES iii 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 1 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF 
APPELLATE REVIEW 1 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 3 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 4 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 8 
ARGUMENT 
I. DEFENDANT CANNOT SHOW EITHER THAT HER DUE 
PROCESS RIGHTS WERE JEOPARDIZED BY THE TRIAL 
COURT'S ALLEGED INACTIONS, NOR THAT HER SENTENCE 
IS "INHERENTLY UNFAIR" 9 
A. Defendant's claim that the trial court did not send a 
"mitigating letter" to the Board of Pardons as promised is 
unsupported by the record and therefore inadequately 
briefed; in any event, defendant fails to cite any authority 
obligating the trial court to send such a letter 12 
B. Defendant fails to offer any legitimate reasons supporting 
her claim that her sentence is "inherently unfair." 13 
II. DEFENSE COUNSEL'S REPRESENTATION WAS ADEQUATE 
GIVEN THE STRONG EVIDENCE OF DEFENDANT'S GUILT AND 
THE PROSECUTOR'S UNWILLINGNESS TO REDUCE THE 
FIRST DEGREE FELONY CHARGE IN EXCHANGE FOR 
DEFENDANT'S GUILTY PLEA 17 
i 
CONCLUSION 
ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A - Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402 (1999); 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (Supp. 2001); 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5 (1998); 
Utah R. App. P. 24; 
ADDENDUM B - Transcript of Sentencing Hearing 
ADDENDUM C - Transcript of Entry of Plea 
i i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
STATE CASES 
Butler, Crockett and Walsh Development Corp. v. Pinecrest Pipeline Operating Co., 909 
P.2d225 (Utah 1995) 12 
Fernandez v. Cook, 870 P.2d 870 (Utah 1993) 18 
Labrum v. Board of Pardons, 870 P.2d 902 (Utah 1993) 13 
State v. Bakalov, 1999 UT 46,979 P.2d 799 13 
State v. Chacon, 962 P.2d 48 (Utah 1998) 2 
State v. Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885, 887 (Utah 1978) 2,11,12,13,15 
State v. Gibbons, 779 P.2d 1133 (Utah 1989) 11 
State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232 (Utah 1992) 20 
State v. Kelley, 2000 UT 41, 394 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 18 
State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76,12P.2d92 17, 18 
State v. Nuttall, 861 P.2d454 (Utah 1993) 11 
State v. Russell, 791 P.2d 188 (Utah 1990) 11,16 
State v. Schweitzer, 943 P.2d 649 (Utah 1997) 2 
State v. Schweitzer, 943 P.2d649 (Utah 1997) 11, 15 
State v. Stromberg, 783 P.2d 54 (Utah 1989) 15 
State v. Willett, 909 P.2d 218 (Utah 1995) 13 
iii 
STATE STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (Supp. 2001) 1,2,14, 15,19 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5 (1998) 2, 19 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402 (1999) 2, 3,14 
Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3 (1996) 1 
UtahR. App. P. 24 2, 12 
Utah R.Crim. P. 11 17 
iv 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
Case No. 20000719-CA 
v. 
CORINNE SKIDMORE, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a sentence for possession of a controlled substance with 
intent to distribute in a drug-free zone, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 58-37-8 (Supp. 2001), in the First Judicial District Court of Cache County, State 
of Utah, the Honorable Thomas L. Willmore, presiding. This Court has jurisdiction 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(j) (1996). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
Issue No. 1: Where defendant's sentencing claims are neither supported by the 
record nor adequately briefed, can she show that her due process rights were jeopardized 
by the trial court's inactions or that her sentence is "inherently unfair"? 
1 
Standard of Review: "The imposition of sentence 'rests entirely within the 
discretion of the [trial] court, within the limits prescribed by law.'" State v. Schweitzer, 
943 P.2d 649, 651 (Utah App. 1997) (citations omitted). "As such, '[an appellate court] 
review[s] the sentencing decisions of a trial court for abuse of discretion.'" Id. (citing 
State v. Houk, 906 P.2d 907, 909 (Utah App. 1995)). An appellate court may find an 
abuse of discretion "only if [it] concludes that 'no reasonable [person] would take the 
view adopted by the trial court.'" Id. (citing State v. Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885, 887 (Utah 
1978)). 
Issue No. 2: Given the strong evidence of defendant's guilt and the prosecutor's 
unwillingness to reduce the first degree felony charge in exchange for defendant's guilty 
plea, was defense counsel's representation sufficient? 
Standard of Review: Ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims on direct appeal are 
reviewed as a matter of law. State v. Chacon, 962 P.2d 48, 50 (Utah 1998). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following are reproduced in Addendum A: 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402 (1999); 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (Supp. 2001); 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5 (1998); 
Utah R. App. P. 24. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged by information with possession of a controlled substance 
with intent to distribute in a drug-free zone, a first degree felony, and possession of drug 
paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor. R. 14-15. 
On May 19, 2000, defendant waived her right to a preliminary hearing and entered 
a "not guilty" plea. R. 22-23. She later entered into a plea agreement with the State, 
pleading "guilty" to Count I, possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute 
in a drug-free zone, a first degree felony. R. 29-37; 70:2-8. In response, the State agreed 
to dismiss Count II, possession of drug paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor. R. 20-21; 
68:1; 70:8. The court entered defendant's guilty plea and ordered a presentence report 
("PSI"). R. 27; 70:8. 
Prior to sentencing, defendant filed a motion to reduce her sentence to a second 
degree felony pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402 (1999). R. 40-41. The court 
denied defendant's motion and sentenced her to an indeterminate term of five years to life 
in the Utah State Prison. R. 13-16. Defendant timely appeals her sentence. R. 45-46. 
3 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS1 
On March 7, 2000, using a no-knock warrant, police entered defendant's house, 
located one house away from Lewiston Elementary School, to search for drugs and drug 
paraphernalia. R. 68:3. Officer Brent Auman encountered defendant in her garage. Id. 
Defendant immediately told Officer Auman that she frequently used methamphetamine 
and had injected the drug just prior to their entry. Id. Officer Auman noticed that 
defendant's arms bore numerous puncture wounds from needle injections. Id. 
The contraband. Defendant then led the officers to the location of the drugs in her 
house. Id. Inside a metal strong box, officers discovered two plastic containers; one 
contained a large rock of "crack" and the other contained a large amount of crystal meth. 
R. 68:3-4. The box also contained a set of plastic scales, syringes, a tourniquet, a spoon, 
a glass pipe, straws, numerous small plastic baggies and envelopes, and two small metal 
containers holding small plastic baggies of pre-measured meth. Id. 
A further search of defendant's house revealed additional contraband. Id. On top 
of the refrigerator officers discovered a straw, a mirror spotted with drug residue, and a 
razor blade. Id. In defendant's bedroom, inside her top dresser drawer, was a meth pipe 
containing drug residue, a straw, and a razor blade. Id. Under defendant's night stand 
was a gray metal money box containing $1,580.00 in cash. Id. On top of that night stand 
1
 The facts are taken primarily from the PSI, including both defendant's version 
and the official version of the events. 
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was a notebook containing the names of defendant's drug customers, dollar amounts, and 
the amount of drugs those individuals had purchased. Id. A similar notebook also 
containing drug sale information and $206.00 in cash was found within defendant's day 
planner. Id. On a shelf in defendant's craft room was a box of unused syringes, a 
propane torch, and a mirror which held two straws and a small rock of "crank." Id. The 
total weight of the drugs seized amounted to nearly 20 grams of meth. R. 68:4. 
Building a case against defendant. The prior year, Detective Mitch Frost 
received several reports of defendant's drug use from a confidential informant. R. 68:1-2. 
The informant notified Detective Frost of the large amount of traffic at defendant's 
residence, and that the occupants of those vehicles would quickly come and go from 
defendant's house. R. 68:2. Given Detective Frost's background and training, he 
recognized that type of traffic pattern as consistent with drug distribution. Id. 
Additionally, North Park Police Officer Roger Jardine contacted Officer Auman 
concerning defendant's drug distribution activities. Id. Before beginning work as a full-
time police officer in the fall of 1999, Officer Jardine worked with defendant at 
Pepperidge Farms. Id. At work, Officer Jardine was told by other employees that 
defendant was dealing meth. Id. Officer Jardine observed defendant meet during the 
lunch hour in the parking lot with other employees suspected of using meth. Id. Those 
individuals would briefly meet defendant at her car and then leave to go to their own cars. 
Id. Other employees told Officer Jardine that those employees would meet defendant, 
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purchase drugs from her, and then return to their own vehicles to use the drugs. Id. 
In February, 2000, another confidential informant informed Detective Frost that 
defendant was using and distributing meth. Id. Detective Frost considered that informant 
to be reliable. Id. 
In response to that information, Detective Frost and Drug Task Force Agent Justin 
Peterson began to conduct their own investigation into the matter. Id. On February 24, 
2000, they searched defendant's trash can after it had been placed on the edge of the road 
for pickup. Id. Inside they found many used syringes, some with brownish liquid residue 
inside and some with what appeared to be blood residue inside. Id. The brownish liquid 
tested positive for meth. Id. Through the officer's training they identified the blood as 
evidence that the substance was injected inside the user's vein and not muscles as is done 
in giving insulin injections for diabetes. Id. Further, the officers recognized that insulin 
is a clear liquid not consistent with the brownish colored liquid they discovered. Id. 
Finally, the officers discovered a letter addressed to defendant and many small plastic zip-
lock baggies commonly used to package meth. Id. 
On March 2, 2000, Detective Frost, Agent Peterson, and Drug Task Force Agents 
Rob LeVan and Shand Nazer again searched defendant's trash can after it had placed on 
the edge of the road for pickup. Id. Again they found many syringes containing brownish 
liquid which again tested positive for meth and blood residue. Id. Additionally, they 
found a small zip-lock baggie and a plastic bag which was knotted and had the comer 
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pulled off. Id. The missing comer was also located. Id. The officers recognized that the 
knot in the plastic bag and the torn comer were consistent with drug packaging and 
removal practices. Id. Various bills and letters containing defendant's name and address 
were also located in the trash can. R. 68:2-3. Based on the above information, the 
officers requested the no-knock search warrant they later served on defendant. R. 1-2, 7-
10; 68:3. 
Defendant confesses. In addition to her signed written confession contained in the 
plea agreement (R. 29-37), defendant also confessed her guilt to the PSI investigator. R. 
68:4. In that confession, defendant wrote, "I was a meth user and I did sell it. I do admit 
it was wrong." Id. Defendant explained that she sold the drugs because "[i]t was an easy 
way to make money." Id. She also indicated that she willingly cooperated with the police 
when her home was searched. Id. 
During a conversation with the investigator, defendant admitted that she had been 
using and selling meth for two and a half years prior to her arrest. Id. She also admitted 
to buying one-half to one ounce per week, sometimes twice during a week, and that her 
daily use was between one-half to three-quarter grams. Id. 
1 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I: Defendant claims that her due process rights were violated when the 
trial court allegedly did not follow through with its sympathetic offer to write a letter to 
the Board of Pardons listing certain mitigating factors and encouraging early parole. 
However, defendant's claim is completely unsupported by the record and therefore 
inadequately briefed. Notwithstanding those procedural inadequacies, defendant cites no 
authority, and the State is aware of none, obligating the trial court to write such a letter 
whether offered or not. 
Although defendant concedes that her sentence is lawful, she also claims that it is 
"inherently unfair." She cites four assertions as to support her claim. Each of those 
assertions is frivolous. 
POINT II: Defendant also claims that her counsel was ineffective for a variety of 
reasons. This claim fails because none of those reasons are supported by the record. In 
any event, given the State's overwhelming evidence against defendant and the 
prosecutor's unwillingness to offer a reduction of the first degree felony in exchange for 
defendant's guilty plea, defendant cannot show that her counsel's actions fell below the 
objective standard of reasonable assistance, nor that she was prejudiced in any manner. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT CANNOT SHOW EITHER THAT HER 
DUE PROCESS RIGHTS WERE JEOPARDIZED BY 
THE TRIAL COURT'S ALLEGED INACTIONS, NOR 
THAT HER SENTENCE IS "INHERENTLY UNFAIR" 
Defendant claims that she was substantially denied due process which resulted in a 
sentence that was inherently unfair. Br. of Aplt. at 12. In essence, defendant's claim is 
separable into two distinct assertions: (1) defendant claims that the trial court did not send 
a letter noting the mitigating circumstances of her offense to the Board of Pardons, thus 
denying her due process; and (2) although defendant concedes that her sentence is lawful, 
she claims that the circumstances surrounding her crime illustrate that her sentence is 
inherently unfair and unduly harsh. Br. of Aplt. at 12-17. For the reasons set forth below, 
defendant's claims are frivolous. 
At sentencing, the trial court noted that it had received the PSI and then heard 
argument from defense counsel and the prosecutor, and statements by defendant's 
relatives. R. 69:3-13. Then, the court imposed the following sentence: 
Ms. Skidmore, your case today has caused me more concern than all 
the cases I've got for sentencing today. I've spent a lot of time going over 
this report, looking at the file, trying to decide what to do. 
On one hand I see a person that has very minimal involvement with 
the criminal justice system. I see a person that's got relatively good family 
support. I appreciate them here today and the comments that they've made. 
In the presentence report you were very upfront [sic] with AP&P and 
with the police. There's been some discussion concerning that. 
The difference between what [the prosecutor] points out, as far as 
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another sentencing case, is that that was purely for profit. Yours was for 
profit and for your own use. 
The problem that I've got with this case, and what causes me so 
much concern, is that when the police did come to your house there were 
almost 20 grams of meth. There was over $1,500 worth of cash. And your 
day planner contained names and dollar amounts and people you had sold 
drugs to. This just wasn't simply you using. It was one house away from 
Lewiston Elementary school. 
You sold, you told the probation officer, because it was an easy way 
to make money. You sold for over two-and-a-half years for an income to 
support your habit. And I appreciate the fact that you were honest with 
AP&P when you did tell them that, but that's a lot of sales over that point in 
time, a lot of distribution. That's a lot of lives affected by this terrible drug, 
as Mr. Breeze has so eloquently pointed out. 
In your own statements to AP&P you were using a half to one ounce 
per week, using and selling. And that is a lot of drugs over two-and -a-half 
years of this terrible drug being distributed through this community. 
I have looked at and weighed very carefully, is there any other thing 
I can look at besides prison? Yes, there are things I could look at. But you 
need to understand that my job is to weigh not only punishment to you, but 
also deterrence to you for the future. And I think that you're well on the 
way for yourself as far as controlling this habit, but you need more than just 
walking away cold turkey. Then there is also general deterrence which 
needs to be looked at as far as not allowing distribution of 
methamphetamine in this community. 
Base upon that I am going to follow—Mr. Breeze has made an 
excellent, eloquent argument, but I want you to understand my decision 
here today is based after a lot of deliberation, trying to figure out what's 
best for you and what's best for this community. I am going to follow the 
recommendation. I am sentencing to you [sic] five years to life in the Utah 
State prison. 
R. 69:13-15. 
As a sympathetic gesture, the court then offered to write a letter to the 
parole board, pointing out various mitigating factors such as defendant's 
cooperation with police and defendant's familial support, and encouraging the 
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board to consider early release into a halfway house or treatment center. R. 69:15. 
The court stressed, however, that its principal duty is to society—to stop the flow 
of drugs and send a message to other drug criminals. Id. Finally, the judge 
advised defendant to maintain hope and take advantage of the drug treatment and 
education programs available at the state prison, and noted that her involvement in 
those programs would be viewed favorably by the parole board. R. 69:16. 
Toward the end of the hearing, defendant reminded the court of her section 
76-3-402 Motion to Sentence as a Second Degree Felony, claiming that the Board 
of Pardons would also have discretion to parole her early under a reduced 
sentence. Id. The court, however, denied defendant's motion based on the facts 
and circumstances of her case. Id. 
"A sentence will not be overturned on appeal unless the trial court has abused its 
discretion, failed to consider all legally relevant factors, or imposed a sentence that 
exceeds legally prescribed limits." State v. Nuttall, 861 P.2d 454,457 (Utah Ct. App. 
1993); accord State v. Gibbons, 779 P.2d 1133, 1135 (Utah 1989); State v. Schweitzer, 
943 P.2d 649, 651 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). "An abuse of discretion may be manifest if the 
actions of the judge in sentencing were 'inherently unfair' or if the judge imposed a 
'clearly excessive' sentence." State v. Russell, 791 P.2d 188, 192-93 (Utah 1990) 
(quoting State v. Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885, 887 (Utah 1978)). "The exercise of discretion in 
sentencing necessarily reflects the personal judgment of the court and the appellate court 
11 
can properly find abuse only if it can be said that no reasonable [person] would take the 
view adopted by the trial court." Gerrard, 584 P.2d at 887. 
A. Defendant's claim that the trial court did not send a "mitigating letter" to the 
Board of Pardons as promised is unsupported by the record and therefore 
inadequately briefed; in any event, defendant fails to cite any authority 
obligating the trial court to send such a letter. 
Defendant's claim that she was denied due process when the trial court allegedly 
did not send a "mitigating letter" to the Board of Pardons as promised is unsupported by 
the record and, therefore, inadequately briefed. See Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9) ("The 
argument shall contain the contentions and reasons of the appellant with respect to the 
issues presented . . . with citations to the . . . parts of the record relied on."). 
Although defendant claims that the trial court's alleged inaction denied her due 
process, she points to no record evidence showing that the court failed to send such a 
letter, nor any record evidence that the Board of Pardons did not receive it. See Br. Of 
Aplt. at 11-17.2 Accordingly, this Court should consider defendant's unsupported factual 
allegations inadequately briefed, and presume the regularity of the proceeding below. See 
Butler, Crockett and Walsh Dev. Corp. v. Pinecrest Pipeline Operating Co., 909 P.2d 
225, 230 (Utah 1995) ("[An appellate court] will not accept as true factual allegations in 
Concurrent with this brief, the State has filed a Motion to Strike Extra-Record 
Factual Material From Appellant's Brief. In that motion, the State requests that a 
purported letter from defendant's appellate counsel addressed to the Board of Pardons 
and a purported newspaper article, both presented as appellant's Addendum B, and any 
references thereto, be stricken from appellant's brief, as this material is not present in the 
record. 
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briefs not properly cited to the record."); State v. Willett, 909 P.2d 218, 221 (Utah 1995) 
(failure to cite to the record in a brief is grounds for assuming regularity in the 
proceedings below). 
Notwithstanding defendant's failure to support her claim with proper record 
citation, defendant cites no authority, and the State is aware of none, obligating a trial 
court to send a "mitigating letter" to the Board of Pardons. See Br. of Aplt. at 12-17. To 
the contrary, any recommendation offered by the trial judge to the Board amounts simply 
to that judge's non-binding personal opinion and is neither mandated nor prohibited by 
law. See State v. Bakalov, 1999 UT 46, f 75, 979 P.2d 799 (trial judge's recommendation 
to the Board of Pardons was a non-binding personal opinion); Labrum v. Board of 
Pardons, 870 P.2d 902, 907 (Utah 1993) (under the Utah indeterminate sentencing 
scheme, "the trial judge has no discretion in fixing the term of imprisonment") (citations 
and quotations omitted)). Therefore, defendant has not shown that the trial court's 
actions were unreasonable or that it abused its discretion in any manner. See Gerrard, 
584 P.2d at 887. 
B. Defendant fails to offer any legitimate reasons supporting her claim that her 
sentence is "inherently unfair.'5 
While defendant concedes that her sentence is lawful, she lists four reasons why 
she claims it is "inherently unfair." See Br. of Aplt. at 12, 15-17. Each lacks merit. 
First, defendant claims that the trial court improperly delegated to the Board of 
Pardons its determination of defendant's section 76-3-402 Motion to Sentence as a 
13 
Second Degree Felony. Br. of Aplt. at 16.3 However, at sentencing the court denied 
defendant's motion based on the facts and circumstances of defendant's case. See R. 
69:13-16. Thus, defendant's first assertion as to why her sentence is "inherently unfair" 
is contradicted by the record. 
Second, defendant claims that her conviction of a first degree felony was "due to 
the fact that she resided within a 1000 [feet of] a school[,]" and had she been residing 
elsewhere, under Utah Code Ann. § Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 she would have been 
convicted of only a second degree felony. Br. of Aplt. at 16. Without citing any 
authority, defendant further asserts that the legislative intent of section 58-37-8 was only 
to prevent drugs from being sold to students, and because she was not selling to students, 
the mandatory sentencing increase to a first degree felony under section 58-37-8 should 
not apply to her. Id. at n.3. Defendant's second assertion runs contrary to a plain 
language interpretation of section 58-37-8, and therefore lacks merit. 
Section 58-37-8 states that possession of a controlled substance within 1000 feet of 
3Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402 (1999) provides in relevant part: 
(1) If the court, having regard to the nature and circumstances of the offense 
of which the defendant was found guilty and to the history and character of 
the defendant, concludes it would be unduly harsh to record the conviction 
as being for that degree of offense established by statute and to sentence the 
defendant to an alternative normally applicable to that offense, the court 
may unless otherwise specifically provided by law enter a judgment of 
conviction for the next lower degree of offense and impose sentence 
accordingly. 
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a school is punishable as a first degree felony. See Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (Supp. 
2001). A plain language reading of section 58-37-8 reveals that the legislature intended 
to punish as a first degree felony not only the sale of drugs to students, but any possession 
of drugs by anyone within 1000 feet of a school. See State v. Stromberg, 783 P.2d 54, 59-
60 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (the plain language of section 58-37-8 clearly increases the 
punishment for convicted drug offenders, whether trafficking or not, where the offenses 
occurred with 1000 feet of a school). Accordingly, defendant's second assertion 
contradicts the plain language section 58-37-8 and does not show that her sentence was 
"inherently unfair." See id. 
Third, defendant argues that her sentence is "inherently unfair" because the 
amount she admitted to consuming—one-half to three-quarter grams of meth per 
day—and the nearly twenty grams of meth discovered at her home were for personal use 
and sold only to support her habit. Br. of Aplt. at 16. However, together with her 
confession that she sold drugs for two-and-a-half years, the trial court appropriately 
considered this claim as an aggravating rather than mitigating factor. See R. 69:13-14. 
Cf. Schweitzer, 943 P.2d 649, 651 ("The imposition of sentence 'rests entirely within the 
discretion of the [trial] court, within the limits prescribed by law.'" (citations omitted)); 
Gerrard, 584 P.2d at 887 ("The exercise of discretion in sentencing necessarily reflects 
the personal judgment of the court and the appellate court can properly find abuse only if 
it can be said that no reasonable [person] would take the view adopted by the trial 
15 
court."); Russell, 791 P.2d at 192 ("One factor in mitigation or aggravation may weigh 
more than several factors on the opposite scale."). Thus, defendant's third assertion 
lacks merit. 
Fourth, defendant claims that the fact that she was not found operating a 
clandestine lab is another mitigating factor which the court did not consider, therefore, 
making her sentence "inherently unfair." Br. of Aplt. at 16. This claim, however, is not 
relevant to her present charges. See R. 14-15. That she did not commit an additional 
crime does not entitle her to a more lenient sentence for the crime she did commit. 
Further, in light of defendant's confession to the PSI investigator that she purchased the 
drugs in Ogden and then re-sold them to make a profit, the allegation that defendant may 
not have manufactured drugs is hardly a mitigating factor. See R. 68:4. Accordingly, 
defendant's fourth reason for claiming that her sentence is "inherently unfair" also fails. 
Given defendant's failure to support her argument with any legitimate reasons as 
to why her sentence is "inherently unfair," or to show that the trial court abused its 
discretion regarding a promised recommendation to the Board of Pardons, defendant's 
indeterminate sentence of five years to life for her first degree felony conviction must 
stand. 
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POINT II 
DEFENSE COUNSEL'S REPRESENTATION WAS 
ADEQUATE GIVEN THE STRONG EVIDENCE OF 
DEFENDANT'S GUILT AND THE PROSECUTOR'S 
UNWILLINGNESS TO REDUCE THE FIRST DEGREE 
FELONY CHARGE IN EXCHANGE FOR 
DEFENDANT'S GUILTY PLEA 
Defendant next claims that she received ineffective assistance from her counsel. 
Br. of Aplt. at 17-22. Defendant lists a myriad of allegations against her counsel 
including: 1) counsel did not challenge the evidence presented against defendant at any 
hearing; 2) counsel encouraged defendant to waive the preliminary hearing; 3) counsel 
encouraged defendant to plead guilty; 4) at sentencing, counsel emphasized how meth 
was a terrible drug; 5) once the plea agreement was reached, counsel did not offer the 
tentative version of the agreement to the court for review under rule 11(h)(2), Utah Rules 
of Criminal Procedure; 6) although counsel properly filed a section 76-3-402 Motion to 
Sentence as a Second Degree Felony, he did not list all possible mitigating factors in that 
motion; 7) counsel did not conduct a reasonable investigation into the facts surrounding 
defendant's case; and 8) counsel did not "follow-up" on the trial court's offer to write a 
"mitigating letter" to the Board of Pardons. Br. of Aplt. at 18-22. Each of those 
allegations lacks merit. 
To show ineffective assistance of council under the Strickland test, "a defendant 
must first demonstrate that counsel's performance was deficient, in that it fell below an 
objective standard of reasonable professional judgment." State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, 
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1fl9, 12 P.3d 92 (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-89 (1984) (other 
citations omitted)). "Second, the defendant must show that counsel's deficient 
performance was prejudicial—i.e., that it affected the outcome of the case." Id. Accord 
State v. Kelley, 2000 UT 41, f25, 394 Utah Adv. Rep. 3. 
Defendant bears the heavy burden of establishing her counsel's ineffectiveness, by 
providing supporting arguments which cite the record. See Litherland, 2000 UT 76, fflf 8, 
11. "[P]roof of ineffective assistance of counsel cannot be a speculative matter but must 
be a demonstrable reality." Fernandez v. Cook, 870 P.2d 870, 877 (Utah 1993). ""If an 
appellant fails to provide an adequate record on appeal, this Court must assume the 
regularity of the proceedings below."" Litherland, 2000 UT 76, f 11 (quoting State v. 
Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219, 1226 (Utah 1997) (quoting Jolivet v. Cook, 784 P.2d 1148, 
1150 (Utah 1989) (additional citations omitted)). 
Here, defendant presents no record evidence to support her claims and, therefore, 
does not meet her burden under Strickland. In particular, defendant claims that counsel 
encouraged her to plead guilty, failed to conduct a reasonable investigation, and that 
counsel did not "follow-up" on the "mitigating letter" offered by the trial judge, yet 
defendant fails to list any record support for those claims. See Br. of Aplt at 18-22. 
In any event, because the State had ample evidence against defendant and was 
unwilling to compromise to obtain a guilty plea, defendant cannot show that her counsel's 
actions were either unreasonable or prejudicial. The evidence against defendant was 
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strong: two reliable confidential informants separately informed police of defendant's 
drug trafficking activities (see R. 68:1-2); on two occasions police lawfully obtained a 
massive amount of incriminating evidence from defendant's trash {see R. 68:2-3); Officer 
Jardine, a former co-worker, witnessed defendant's drug activities and informed police of 
what he observed (see R. 68:2); during the search of defendant's home, she willingly 
showed police where her drugs were located (see R. 68:3-4); police obtained numerous 
items of incriminating evidence from their lawful search including drug paraphernalia, 
names and addresses of her drug customers and the amount of drugs that each customer 
had purchased, nearly twenty grams of meth, and over $1500 cash (see id.); needle marks 
on defendant's arms and her confession to police established her guilt (see R. 68:3); and 
defendant's home is located within 1000 feet from Lewiston Elementary (see id.). 
Clearly the State had ample evidence to convict defendant of both possession of a 
controlled substance with intent to distribute in a drug-free zone, a first degree felony, and 
possession of drug paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor. See Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 
(Supp. 2001); Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5 (1998). Further, given this evidence, the 
prosecutor refused to plea bargain down from the first degree felony. See R. 69:12. 
Under those circumstances, defense counsel did the only thing he could—encourage 
defendant to plead guilty to the first degree felony in exchange for dismissal of Count II, 
possession of drug paraphernalia, and file a section 76-3-402 Motion to Sentence as a 
Second Degree Felony. 
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In light of defendant's failure to present record evidence supporting her claim, the 
strength of the State's case against defendant, and the prosecutor's willingness to dismiss 
only Count II of the charges in exchange for a guilty plea, defendant cannot show that her 
counsel's actions fell below the objective standard for effective assistance, nor that she 
was prejudiced in any fashion by counsel's actions. See State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 
240 (Utah 1992) (the more evidence supporting a conviction, the less likely there was 
harmful error). Accordingly, defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim fails. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the State respectfully requests the Court to affirm 
defendant's sentence. 
•Hi 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / 7 day of September, 2001. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
^ 
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20 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
d 
I hereby certify that on this _ / 2 _ day of September, 2001,1 mailed, postage 
prepaid, two accurate copies of the foregoing Appellee's Brief to: 
D. BRUCE OLIVER 
D. Bruce Oliver, P.C. 
180 South 300 West, Suite 210 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1490 
21 
ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
(1) If the court, having regard to the nature and circumstances of the offense 
of which the defendant was found guilty and to the history and character of the 
defendant, concludes it would be unduly harsh to record the conviction as being 
for that degree of offense established by statute and to sentence the defendant 
to an alternative normally applicable to that offense, the court may unless 
otherwise specifically provided by law enter a judgment of conviction for the 
next lower degree of offense and impose sentence accordingly. 
(2) If a conviction is for a third degree felony the conviction is considered to 
be for a class A misdemeanor if: 
(a) the judge designates the sentence to be for a class A misdemeanor 
and the sentence imposed is within the limits provided by law for a class 
A misdemeanor; or 
(b) (i) the imposition of the sentence is stayed and the defendant is 
placed on probation, whether committed to jail as a condition of 
probation or not; 
(ii) the defendant is subsequently discharged without violating his 
probation; and 
(iii) the judge upon motion and notice to the prosecuting attorney, 
and a hearing if requested by either party or the court, finds it is in the 
interest of justice that the conviction be considered to be for a class A 
misdemeanor. 
(3) An offense may be reduced only one degree under this section unless the 
prosecutor specifically agrees in writing or on the court record that the offense 
may be reduced two degrees. In no case may an offense be reduced under this 
section by more than two degrees. 
(4) This section may not be construed to preclude any person from obtaining 
or being granted an expungement of his record as provided by law. 
(1) Prohibited acts A — Penalties: 
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person to 
knowingly and intentionally: 
(i) produce, manufacture, or dispense, or to possess with intent to 
produce, manufacture, or dispense, a controlled or counterfeit sub-
stance; 
(ii) distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, or to agree,, 
consent, offer, or arrange to distribute a controlled or counterfeit 
substance; 
(iii) possess a controlled or counterfeit substance with intent to 
distribute; or 
(iv) engage in a continuing criminal enterprise where: 
(A) the person participates, directs, or engages in conduct 
which results in any violation of any provision of Title 58, 
Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d that is a felony; and 
(B) the violation is a part of a continuing series of two or more 
violations of Title 58, Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d on 
separate occasions that are undertaken in concert with five or 
more persons with respect to whom the person occupies a position 
of organizer, supervisor, or any other position of management. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (l)(a) with respect to: 
(i) a substance classified in Schedule I or II or a controlled sub-
stance analog is guilty of a second degree felony and upon a second or 
subsequent conviction is guilty of a first degree felony; 
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule III or IV, or marijuana, is 
guilty of a third degree felony, and upon a second or subsequent 
conviction is guilty of a second degree felony; or 
(iii) a substance classified in Schedule V is guilty of a class A 
misdemeanor and upon a second or subsequent conviction is guilty of 
a third degree felony. 
(c) Any person who has been convicted of a violation of Subsection 
(lXaXii) or (iii) may be sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate 
term as provided by law, but if the trier of fact finds a firearm as defined 
in Section 76-10-501 was used, carried, or possessed on his person or in his 
immediate possession during the commission or in furtherance of the 
offense, the court shall additionally sentence the person convicted for a 
term of one year to run consecutively and not concurrently; and the court 
may additionally sentence the person convicted for an indeterminate term 
not to exceed five years to run consecutively and not concurrently. 
(d) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (lXaXiv) is guilty of a 
first degree felony punishable by imprisonment for an indeterminate term 
of not less than seven years and which may be for life. Imposition or 
execution of the sentence may not be suspended, and the person is not 
eligible for probation. 
(2) Prohibited acts B — Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful: 
(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess or use a 
controlled substance, unless it was obtained under a valid prescrip-
tion or order, directly from a practitioner while acting in the course of 
his professional practice, or as otherwise authorized by this chapter; 
(ii) for any owner, tenant, licensee, or person in control of any 
building, room, tenement, vehicle, boat, aircraft, or other place 
knowingly and intentionally to permit them to be occupied by persons 
unlawfully possessing, using, or distributing controlled substances in 
any of those locations; or 
(iii) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess an 
altered or forged prescription or written order for a controlled sub-
stance. 
(u) a substance classified in Schedule I or II, marijuana, if the 
a m
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controlled substance analog, is guilty of a third degree felony; or 
(ui) marijuana, if the marijuana is not in the form of an extracted 
resin from any part of the plant, and the amount is more than one 
ounce but less than 16 ounces, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 
(c) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2XaXi) while inside 
the exterior boundaries of property occupied by any correctional facility as 
defined in Section 64-13-1 or any pubhc jail or other place of confinement 
shall be sentenced to a penalty one degree greater than provided m 
Subsection (2Kb). 
(d) Upon a second or subsequent conviction of possession of any 
controlled substance by a person, that person shall be sentenced to a one 
degree greater penalty than provided in this Subsection (2). 
(e) Any person who violates Subsection (2)(a)(i) with respect to all other 
controlled substances not included in Subsection (2)(b)(i), (u), or (m), 
including less than one ounce of marijuana, is guilty of a class B 
misdemeanor. Upon a second conviction the person is guilty of a class A 
misdemeanor, and upon a third or subsequent conviction the person is 
guilty of a third degree felony. 
(f) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(ii) or (2)(a)(in) is: 
(i) on a first conviction, guilty of a class B misdemeanor; 
(li) on a second conviction, guilty of a class A misdemeanor; and 
(hi) on a third or subsequent conviction, guilty of a third degree 
felony. 
(3) Prohibited acts C — Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful for any person knowingly and intentionally-
d) to use in the course of the manufacture or distribution of a 
controlled substance a license number which is fictitious, revoked, 
suspended, or issued to another person or, for the purpose of obtaining 
a controlled substance, to assume the title of, or represent himself to 
be, a manufacturer, wholesaler, apothecary, physician, dentist, veteri-
narian, or other authorized person; 
(ii) to acquire or obtain possession of, to procure or attempt to 
procure the administration of, to obtain a prescnption for, to prescribe 
or dispense to any person known to be attempting to acquire or obtain 
possession of, or to procure the administration of any controlled 
substance by misrepresentation or failure by the person to disclose his 
receiving any controlled substance from another source, fraud, forg-
ery, deception, subterfuge, alteration of a prescnption or written order 
for a controlled substance, or the use of a false name or address; 
(iii) to make any false or forged prescription or written order for a 
controlled substance, or to utter the same, or to alter any prescnption 
or written order issued or written under the terms of this chapter; or 
(iv) to make, distnbute, or possess any punch, die, plate, stone, or 
other thing designed to print, imprint, or reproduce the trademark, 
trade name, or other identifying mark, imprint, or device of another or 
any likeness of any of the foregoing upon any drug or container or 
labeling so as to render any drug a counterfeit controlled substance. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (3)(a) is guilty of a 
third degree felony. 
(4) Prohibited acts D — Penalties: 
(a) Notwithstanding other provisions of this section, a person not 
authorized under this chapter who commits any act declared to be 
unlawful under this section, Title 58, Chapter 37a, Utah Drug Parapher-
nalia Act, or under Title 58, Chapter 37b, Imitation Controlled Substances 
Act, is upon conviction subject to the penalties and classifications under 
Subsection (4Kb) if the act is committed: 
(i) in a public or pnvate elementary or secondary school or on the 
grounds of any of those schools; 
(u) m a public or pnvate vocational school or postsecondary insti-
tution or on the grounds of any of those schools or institutions; 
(ni) in those portions of any building, park, stadium, or other 
structure or grounds which are, at the time of the act, being used for 
an activity sponsored by or through a school or institution under 
(v) in a public park, amusement park, arcade, or recreation center; 
(vi) in a church or synagogue; 
(vii) in a shopping mall, sports facility, stadium, arena, theater, 
movie house, playhouse, or parking lot or structure adjacent thereto; 
(viii) in a public parking lot or structure; 
(ix) within 1,000 feet of any structure, facility, or grounds included 
in Subsections (4)(a)(i) through (viii); or 
(x) in the immediate presence of a person younger than 18 years of 
age, regardless of where the act occurs. 
(b) A person convicted under this Subsection (4) is guilty of a first 
degree felony and shall be imprisoned for a term of not less than five years 
if the penalty that would otherwise have been established but for this 
subsection would have been a first degree felony. Imposition or execution 
of the sentence may not be suspended, and the person is not eligible for 
probation. 
(c) If the classification that would otherwise have been established 
would have been less than a first degree felony but for this Subsection (4), 
a person convicted under this Subsection (4) is guilty of one degree more 
than the maximum penalty prescribed for that offense. 
(d) It is not a defense to a prosecution under this Subsection (4) that the 
actor mistakenly believed the individual to be 18 years of age or older at 
the time of the offense or was unaware of the individual's true age; nor 
that the actor mistakenly believed that the location where the act occurred 
was not as described in Subsection (4)(a) or was unaware that the location 
where the act occurred was as described in Subsection (4)(a). 
(5) Any violation of this chapter for which no penalty is specified is a class 
B misdemeanor. 
(6) (a) Any penalty imposed for violation of this section is in addition to, and 
not in lieu of, any civil or administrative penalty or sanction authorized by 
law. 
(b) Where violation of this chapter violates a federal law or the law of 
another state, conviction or acquittal under federal law or the law of 
another state for the same act is a bar to prosecution in this state. 
(7) In any prosecution for a violation of this chapter, evidence or proof which 
shows a person or persons produced, manufactured, possessed, distributed, or 
dispensed a controlled substance or substances, is prima facie evidence that 
the person or persons did so with knowledge of the character of the substance 
or substances. 
(8) This section does not prohibit a veterinarian, in good faith and in the 
course of his professional practice only and not for humans, from prescribing, 
dispensing, or administering controlled substances or from causing the sub-
stances to be administered by an assistant or orderly under his direction and 
supervision. 
(9) Civil or criminal liability may not be imposed under this section on: 
(a) any person registered under the Controlled Substances Act who 
manufactures, distributes, or possesses an imitation controlled substance 
for use as a placebo or investigational new drug by a registered practitio-
ner in the ordinary course of professional practice or research; or 
(b) any law enforcement officer acting in the course and legitimate 
scope of his employment. 
(10) If any provision of this chapter, or the application of any provision to 
any person or circumstances, is held invalid, the remainder of this chapter 
shall be given effect without the invalid provision or application. 
58-37a-5. Unlawful acts. 
(1) It is unlawful for any person to use, or to possess with intent to use, drug 
paraphernalia to plant, propagate, cultivate, grow, harvest, manufacture, 
compound, convert, produce, process, prepare, test, analyze, pack, repack! 
store, contain, conceal, inject, ingest, inhale or otherwise introduce a controlled 
substance into the human body in violation of this chapter. Any person who 
violates this subsection is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. 
(2) It is unlawful for any person to deliver, possess with intent to deliver, or 
manufacture with intent to deliver, any drug paraphernalia, knowing that the 
drug paraphernalia will be used to plant, propagate, cultivate, grow, harvest, 
manufacture, compound, convert, produce, process, prepare, test, analyze, 
pack, repack, store, contain, conceal, inject, ingest, inhale, or otherwise 
introduce a controlled substance into the human body in violation of this act. 
Any person who violates this subsection is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 
(3) Any person 18 years of age or over who delivers drug paraphernalia to a 
person under 18 years of age who is three years or more younger than the 
person making the delivery is guilty of a third degree felony. 
(4) It is unlawful for any person to place in this state in any newspaper, 
magazine, handbill, or other publication any advertisement, knowing that the 
purpose of the advertisement is to promote the sale of drug paraphernalia. Any 
person who violates this subsection is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. 
appropriate headings and in the order indicated: 
( D A complete list of all parties to the proceeding in the court or agency 
whose judgment or order is sought to be reviewed, except where the caption of 
the case on appeal contains the names of all such parties. The list should be set 
out on a separate page which appears immediately inside the cover. 
(2) A table of contents, including the contents of the addendum, with page 
references. 
(3) A table of authorities with cases alphabetically arranged and with 
parallel citations, rules, statutes and other authorities cited, with references to 
the pages of the brief where they are cited. 
(4) A brief statement showing the jurisdiction of the appellate court. 
(5) A statement of the issues presented for review, including for eact\ issue: 
the standard of appellate review with supporting authority; and 
(A) citation to the record showing that the issue was preserved in the trial 
court; or 
(B) a statement of grounds for seeking review of an issue not preserved in 
the trial court. 
(6) Constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, and regulations 
whose interpretation is determinative of the appeal or of central importance to 
the appeal shall be set out verbatim with the appropriate citation. If the 
pertinent part of the provision is lengthy, the citation alone will suffice, and the 
provision shall be set forth in an addendum to the brief under paragraph (11) 
of this rule. 
(7) A statement of the case. The statement shall first indicate briefly the 
nature of the case, the course of proceedings, and its disposition in the court 
below. A statement of the facts relevant to the issues presented for review shall 
follow. All statements of fact and references to the proceedings below shall be 
supported by citations to the record in accordance with paragraph le) of this 
rule. 
(8) Summary of arguments. The summary of arguments, suitably 
paragraphed, shall be a succinct condensation of the arguments actually made 
in the body of the brief It shall not be a mere repetition of the heading under 
which the argument is arranged. 
(9) An argument The argument shall contain the contentions and reasons of 
the appellant with respect to the issues presented, including the grounds for 
reviewing any issue not preserved in the trial court, with citations to the 
authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on. A party challenging a 
fact finding must first marshal all record evidence that supports the challenged 
finding. 
(10) A short conclusion stating the precise relief sought 
(11) An addendum to the brief or a statement that no addendum is necessary 
under this paragraph. The addendum shall be bound as part of the brief unless 
doing so makes the brief unreasonably thick. If the addendum is bound 
separately, the addendum shall contain a table of contents. The addendum 
shall contain a copy of: 
(A) any constitutional provision, statute, rule, or regulation of central 
importance cited in the brief but not reproduced verbatim in the brief; 
(B) in cases being reviewed on certiorari, a copy of the Court of Appeals 
opinion; in all cases any court opinion of central importance to the appeal but 
not available to the court as part of a regularly published reporter service; and 
(C) those parts of the record on appeal that are of central importance to the 
determination of the appeal, such as the challenged instructions, findings of 
fact and conclusions of law, memorandum decision, the transcript of the court's 
oral decision, or the contract or document subject to construction. 
(b) Brief of the appellee. The brief of the appellee shall conform to the 
requirements of paragraph (a) of this rule, except that the appellee need not 
include: 
(1) a statement of the issues or of the case unless the appellee is dissatisfied 
with the statement of the appellant; or 
(2) an addendum, except to provide material not included in the addendum 
of the appellant. The appellee may refer to the addendum of the appellant. 
reply to the response of the appellant to the issues presented by the cross-
appeal Reply bnefs shall be limited to answering any new matter set forth in 
the opposing bnef The content of the reply bnef shall conform to the 
requirements of paragraph (a)(2), (3), (9), and (10) of this rule No further 
bnefs may be filed except with leave of the appellate court. 
(d) References in briefs to parties Counsel will be expected m their bnefe 
and oral arguments to keep to a minimum references to parties by such 
designations as "appellant* and "appellee " It promotes clanty to use the 
designations used in the lower court or in the agency proceedings, or the actual 
names of parties, or descnptive terms such as "the employee," "the injured 
person," "the taxpayer," etc. 
(e) References in briefs to the record. References shall be made to the pages 
of the onginal record as paginated pursuant to Rule 1Kb) or to pages of any 
statement of the evidence or proceedings or agreed statement prepared 
pursuant to Rule 11(f) or 11(g) References to pages of published depositions or 
transcnpts shall identify the sequential number of the cover page of each 
volume as marked by the clerk on the bottom nght corner and each separately 
numbered page(s) referred to within the deposition or transcnpt as marked by 
the transcriber References to exhibits shall be made to the exhibit numbers If 
reference is made to evidence the admissibility of which is in controversy, 
reference shall be made to the pages of the record at which the evidence was 
identified, offered, and received or rejected. 
(f) Length of briefs. Except by permission of the court, principal bnefs shall 
not exceed 50 pages, and reply bnefs shall not exceed 25 pages, exclusive of 
ages containing the table of contents, tables of citations and any addendum 
containing statutes, rules, regulations, or portions of the record as required by 
paragraph (a) of this rule In cases involving cross-appeals, paragraph (g) of 
[^ 5 rule sets forth the length of bnefs 
(g) Briefs in cases involving cross-appeals If a cross-appeal is filed, the party 
first filing a notice of appeal shall be deemed the appellant for the purposes of 
fas rule and Rule ?6, unless the parties otherwise agree or the court otherwise 
orders. The bnef of the appellant shall not exceed 50 pages in length The bnef 
of the appellee/cross-appellant shall contain the issues and arguments in-
volved in the cross-appeal as well as the answer to the bnef of the appellant 
and shall not exceed 50 pages in length. The appellant shall then file a bnef 
which contains an answer to the ongmal issues raised by the appellee/cross-
appellant and a reply to the appellee's response to the issues raised in the 
appellant's opening bnef. The appellant's second bnef shall not exceed 25 
pages m length. The appellee/cross-appellant may then file a second bnef, not 
to exceed 25 pages in length, which contains only a reply to the appellant's 
answers to the onginal issues raised by the appellee/cross-appellant's first 
bnef. The lengths specified by this rule are exclusive of table of contents, table 
of authonties, and addenda and may be exceeded only by permission of the 
court. The court shall grant reasonable requests, for good cause shown. 
(h) Briefs in cases involving multiple appellants or appellees In cases 
involving more than one appellant or appellee, including cases consolidated for 
purposes of the appeal, any number of either may join in a single bnef, and any 
appellant or appellee may adopt by reference any part of the bnef of another 
Parties may similarly join in reply bnefs. 
(l) Citation of supplemental authorities When pertinent and significant 
authonties come to the attention of a party after that party's bnef has been 
filed, or after oral argument but before decision, a party may promptly advise 
the clerk of the appellate court, by letter setting forth the citations An ongmal 
letter and nine copies shall be filed in the Supreme Court. An onginal letter 
and seven copies shall be filed in the Court of Appeals. There shall be a 
reference either to the page of the bnef or to a point argued orally to which the 
citations pertain, but the letter shall without argument state the reasons for 
the supplemental citations. Any response shall be made within 7 days of filing 
and shall be similarly limited. 
(j) Requirements and sanctions. All bnefs under this rule must be concise, 
presented with accuracy, logically arranged with proper headings and free 
from burdensome, irrelevant, immatenal or scandalous matters Bnefs which 
are not m compliance may be disregarded or stncken, on motion or sua sponte 
by the court, and the court may assess attorney fees against the offending 
lawyer. 
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IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
CACHE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
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CORINNE SKIDMORE, 
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Case No. 001100222 
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July 25, 2000 
APPEARANCES: 
For the Plaintiff: 
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BRUCE G. WARD 
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Attorney at Law 
213 East 300 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
RODNEY M. FELSHAW 
Registered Professional Reporter 
First District Court 
P. 0. Box 873 
Brigham City, UT 84302-0873 
1 THE CLERK: Case number 001100222, State of Utah 
2 versus Corinne Skidmore. 
3 THE COURT: Mr. Breeze is present together with the 
4 defendant. The presentence report has been prepared and 
5 submitted to the court on June 15th of this year. Ms. 
6 Skidmore pled guilty to first degree felony, distribution of 
7 me t hamphe t ami ne. 
8 Any changes or corrections to the report, Mr. Breeze? 
9 MR. BREEZE: There is one, Your Honor. That is 
10 that the presentence report indicates that the matrix would 
11 be in the black, indicating a mandatory prison sentence. It 
12 actually falls within the intermediate sanction category, 
13 which they've circled on the form one, criminal history 
14 assessment thatf s attached to the back of the report. 
15 THE COURT: Okay. I see that. I also should 
16 indicate for the record that there has been submitted to the 
17 court letters, subsequent letters, that were not included in 
18 the report, which I have reviewed. Go ahead. 
19 MR. BREEZE: Your Honor, first of all I would like 
20 to get Mr. Ward to agree that under the applicable statute 
21 that, because this was without the enhancement of being 
22 within 1,000 feet of the public school there in Lewiston, 
23 that this wouldn't be a mandatory prison sentence. So under 
24 the controlled substance statute, this is not a mandatory 
25 prison sentence and so you do have the option of a lesser 
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1 punishment. 
2 THE COURT: That's what I understand. And I don't 
3 think the state is arguing any different. 
4 MR. WARD: That's my understanding of the statute. 
5 MR. BREEZE: Your Honor, I guess the very first 
6 thing that I want to say is I made a motion to sentence this 
7 as a second degree felony. In that motion I indicated to 
8 the court that Ms. Skidmore, that this was her first 
9 involvement in the criminal justice system. That was in 
10 error. She actually had a DUI in 1982 and a DUI in 83. 
11 THE COURT: I saw that there were the two old DUIs. 
12 MR. BREEZE: I wanted to bring that to the court's 
13 attention. Your Honor, I'm not telling you anything you 
14 don't already know when I say that the plague of 
15 methamphetamine is just a scourge on society. Everybody who 
16 is involved in the court system sees the damage that this 
17 drug does, the power of this drug to destroy lives. 
18 A few months back, actually about a year back, I was 
19 working on a federal methamphetamine case and in the course 
2 0 of that I had the occasion to learn about the history of 
21 methamphetamine and how it has spread throughout the United 
22 States. It quite surprised me. I thought I should bring 
23 that to the court's attention. 
24 What I learned was that the primary ingredient of 
25 methamphetamine is the precursor chemical ephedrine. 
1 Virtually all of the ephedrine, with the exception of 
2 pseudoephedrine which is manufactured in a lab, virtually 
3 all the ephedrine on planet earth grows in a province of 
4 communist China. That's the only place where this 
5 particular plant grows. 
6 There's a cousin to that plant that is used to make 
7 Brigham tea in Utah. It grows out in the desert in 
8 basically the same fashion. It's my understanding that the 
9 DEA is concerned that the chemists are getting to the point 
10 now where they're on the verge of being able to take that 
11 plant and produce ephedrine, or a form of ephedrine, that 
12 can then become methamphetamine. 
13 What Ifm saying, Your Honor, is that this insidious, 
14 diabolical, Satanic drug takes a route from ports in 
15 communist China. It goes to Mexico where it's off-loaded. 
16 And it's not regulated in Mexico. They are able to 
17 manufacture it down there in high quality laboratories at a 
18 very low price. Then they bring it into the United States. 
19 Now, there's a lot that's manufactured in these mini labs, 
20 but the vast majority of methamphetamine that's destroying 
21 our country does come up from Mexico. 
22 Ms. Skidmore, as you can tell by reading the report, is 
23 just a very common, ordinary country person who, with the 
24 exception of a trip to Disneyland or California when she was 
25 a child, has really never traveled more than a hundred miles 
1 from her home. And she is just a very basic human being who 
2 fell prey to this insidious evil drug. The presentence 
3 report indicates the extent of her involvement and how her 
4 life went downhill in a hurry because of her use of this 
5 substance. 
6 There was a time when she was married. And in fact 
7 probably one of the best things you can say about Ms. 
8 Skidmore is that she has two adult daughters that are 
9 present. Will you two stand? Both of these young women are 
10 very decent productive members of society. Ms. Skidmore 
11 raised these daughters, as you can tell from the report, 
12 basically by herself. For whatever personal weaknesses that 
13 led her to get involved with this drug, she did that. 
14 Your Honor knows from sitting on the bench and seeing 
15 the endless stream of methamphetamine cases that come before 
16 you, that the pull of this drug and the power of 
17 methamphetamine is unlike any drug that we've ever seen 
18 before. 
19 Mr. Ward and I -- there is one matter that we need to 
2 0 approach the bench on, if we may. 
21 (Discussion at the bench, not recorded.) 
22 MR. BREEZE: As far as mitigating factors in this 
23 case, one of the letters that Your Honor received was from 
24 Bear River Mental Health that indicates that Ms. Skidmore 
25 has submitted urine samples on a regular basis since her 
1 arrest in this case. Not one of them has turned out to be 
2 positive. We actually have copies of those and in that 
3 report they mention seven, but there's --
4 THE COURT: In the letter from Bear River Drug and 
5 Alcohol it says seven. 
6 MR. BREEZE: We actually have four more clean UA's. 
7 I think one thing that struck me when Ms. Skidmore came 
8 to see me was that she just looked absolutely horrible, Your 
9 Honor. I mean, Mr. Ward, I believe, can verify this, that 
10 she looked like walking death. She was just nothing but 
11 skin and bones. Given the strength of methamphetamine, I 
12 think Mr. Ward and I are both amazed at the inner strength 
13 that Ms. Skidmore has demonstrated in being able to go ahead 
14 and not use and to voluntarily get into treatment and to not 
15 continue to use methamphetamine. I think that's a very 
16 important mitigating factor. 
17 She is clearly amenable to supervision. She's probably 
18 one the most obedient candidates for probation that you'll 
19 ever have. She does have a good employment record. She's 
2 0 been working seven days a week since this happened. I've 
21 already talked about her daughters. She also has a young 
22 son. There has been no indication of involvement in any 
23 illegal activities since the arrest in this case. She has 
24 actually done well in treatment, as the letter indicates. 
25 Ms. Skidmore is obviously not a sophisticated criminal 
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1 person, because she basically just confessed. As soon as 
2 the police arrested her she gave a complete confession. 
3 She's also made full disclosure of all of her involvement to 
4 the presentence investigator. 
5 If Your Honor would be interested, Ms. Skidmore's 
6 closest family members are all here. As you may have noted 
7 from the report, her parents were killed in a car crash in 
8 1995, both of them. If the other family members here would 
9 stand. If Your Honor would like to hear from them, they do 
10 have some comments. 
11 THE COURT: All right. 
12 MR. BREEZE: Ms. Cosette Reese. 
13 THE COURT: You can just stand there and speak from 
14 there. 
15 MS. REESE: I'm Corinnefs older sister so I've 
16 known her all her life. 
17 THE COURT: I've read your letter. 
18 MS. REESE: She's basically a really good person. 
19 Very loving, unselfish. 
2 0 THE COURT: All right. Thank you. 
21 MR. BREEZE: And she has a brother, Victor Reese. 
22 MR. REESE: I'm Victor Reese. The most I can say 
23 about Corinne is she grew up on a farm. She worked hard and 
24 has worked hard most of her life that I've seen. It was a 
25 hard time for us all when our parents died and she had 
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1 concerns with that, as most of us did. I watched her turn 
2 herself around, as she's lived with me a couple of times, 
3 and I've seen her pull herself together. I don't believe 
4 this is any different of a case than that. I believe that 
5 this could be a turning point for her. She's loved and 
6 she's a very good sister. 
7 THE COURT: All right. 
8 MR. BREEZE: Mandy, would you (unintelligible)? 
9 MANDY: (Unintelligible). 
10 MR. BREEZE: Your Honor, what we're asking the 
11 court to do is consider salvaging this human being. She's 
12 in serious jeopardy in this case, but the chance of her --
13 if you were to give her a lesser punishment, the chance of 
14 her running, I think, is pretty close to zero. You can send 
15 her to prison at any time. 
16 I think that the appropriate and just sentence in this 
17 case would be a mixed sentence with some incarceration 
18 combined with work release so that she can continue to 
19 support her young son who is still a minor. And to give her 
20 a chance if she --
21 THE COURT: The son is living with his father, 
22 right? 
23 MR. BREEZE: He is, but she's still expected to 
24 provide support. 
25 THE COURT: All right. 
1 MR. BREEZE: She's been going through the guardian 
2 ad litem and you just received a weekend visitation, is that 
3 correct? She had an unsupervised visit this weekend. She's 
4 made enough progress where all the parties agreed that that 
5 would be appropriate. 
6 Your Honor, I mean, this is a person who almost for her 
7 entire life has been basically a good human being and she's 
8 made a terrible mistake by getting involved in 
9 methamphetamine, as so many other people have. I just 
10 think, Your Honor, that she's salvageable, that she can be 
11 treated. She wants to be treated. She wants to get back 
12 and be a good member of society. If that isn't the case, 
13 you could send her to prison at any time if she doesn't 
14 strictly adhere to everything that Your Honor orders. 
15 Given the status of her life, I think that a mixed 
16 sentence with some incarceration and some help from the 
17 system to make sure she doesn't get back on drugs could 
18 accomplish everything that needs to be done in this case. 
19 THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Breeze. Ms. Skidmore, 
20 do you have anything you'd like to tell me? 
21 MS- SKIDMORE: No, sir. 
22 THE COURT: Mr. Ward. 
23 MR. WARD: Thank you, Your Honor. I do have some 
24 comments that I think are important to make. 
25 The state has no doubt that Ms. Skidmore, at some basic 
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level, is a good person. But at some point in time she made 
a choice and that choice was to profit by the sale of 
methamphetamine. It was easy money. It was a very low risk 
endeavor in terms of being caught by the criminal justice 
system. That's evidenced by the fact that she participated 
in the activity for several years before she was actually 
apprehended. 
She's been characterized as a fairly unsophisticated 
first timer in criminal justice. I would suggest to the 
court that she was sophisticated enough after her arrest 
that she doesn't put her trash out any more so that we can 
grab it. I went out with the officers and drove past her 
residence, which sits right next to the school yard. They 
had information that perhaps this activity was continuing 
and they wanted to do a trash run like they did earlier. It 
doesn't go out so they can't. They can't find out, under 
that technique of investigation, whether this has stopped or 
not. 
Perhaps she has stopped using methamphetamine. I hope 
she has. The fact remains that when they entered the 
residence she had 19.8 grams, which is just shy of an ounce. 
It's about eight grams short of an ounce. About two-thirds, 
almost three-quarters of an ounce. My calculation, from 
what she told the presentence investigation report writer, 
indicates that somewhere between seven and eight pounds of 
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1 methamphetamine flowed through Ms. Skidmore's hands and into 
2 this community. 
3 THE COURT: Over what time period? 
4 MR. WARD: Over a two year, two-and-a-half year 
5 period of time. That is a significant quantity of, 
6 probably, as has been characterized, one of the most evil, 
7 vile drugs our society has ever or may ever see. It's 
8 almost instantly addictive. It is incredibly destructive 
9 both to self and everybody around it. 
10 Ms. Skidmore, by making the choices, has not just hurt 
11 herself and has not just hurt the community, but she's hurt 
12 her entire family. It's admirable that they're here to 
13 support her and vouch for the things that she's done in the 
14 past. Obviously they suffer as part of what has gone on 
15 here as well. But the entire community has suffered. 
16 Your Honor, the recommendation from Adult Probation and 
17 Parole is prison. The state thinks that is appropriate. If 
18 not, Ms. Skidmore, who, given the quantity of drugs, the 
19 length of involvement -- I go back to my notes on a similar 
2 0 individual we had who was much younger who was involved in 
21 drug traffic, Ms. Elaiah Elijavic, she had three ounces in 
22 two sales of cocaine. Ms. Skidmore's not much different, 
23 except that she's a lot older and ought to know better. We 
24 kind of give people a break for being youthful and not 
25 having a full understanding sometimes of the import of their 
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1 conduct. But when you're Ms. Skidmore's age, have seen 
2 society, have raised a family, you know what's going on. 
3 You know what the effects are. We expect more from people 
4 of mature years. 
5 There needs to be a very clear message to the rest of 
6 the community, in terms of a general deterrence, that this 
7 conduct cannot, will not, ever be tolerated. The state in 
8 this case refused in any way, shape or form to plea bargain 
9 down from a first degree felony. This case would either go 
10 to trial or it was going to be pled as it was charged. 
11 That's how strongly the state felt about this case. That's 
12 how strongly we still feel about this case; and that's how 
13 strongly we feel about every other similar case that comes 
14 to light from now on. 
15 We cannot have people selling meth in this community 
16 period. If they do, they need the severe consequence of 
17 prison, because that's the only way we can guarantee that it 
18 stops. 
19 I'm going to submit it on that basis. 
20 THE COURT: All right. Mr. Breeze. 
21 MR. BREEZE: Your Honor, I stand by what I said. I 
22 think that sentencing this as a second degree felony and 
23 imposing a mixed sentence can serve all of the needs that 
24 need to be served. A stay in the county jail with a one to 
25 15 hanging over her would serve all the needs. I believe 
1 that a five to life, given her criminal history, is probably 
2 excessive, given the efforts she's made. 
3 THE COURT: All right. Thank you. Ms. Skidmore, 
4 your case today has caused me more concern than all the 
5 cases I've got for sentencing today. Ifve spent a lot of 
6 time going over this report, looking at the file, trying to 
7 decide what to do. 
8 On one hand I see a person that has very minimal 
9 involvement with the criminal justice system. I see a 
10 person that's got relatively good family support. I 
11 appreciate them here today and the comments that they've 
12 made. 
13 In the presentence report you were very upfront with 
14 AP&P and with the police. There's been some discussion 
15 concerning that. 
16 The difference between what Mr. Ward points out, as far 
17 as another sentencing case, is that that was purely for 
18 profit. Yours was for profit and for your own use. 
19 The problem that I've got with this case, and what 
20 causes me so much concern, is that when the police did come 
21 to your house there were almost 20 grams of meth. There was 
22 over $1,500 worth of cash. And your day planner contained 
23 names and dollar amounts and people you had sold drugs to. 
24 This just wasn't simply you using. It was one house away 
25 from Lewiston Elementary school. 
1 You sold, you told the probation officer, because it 
2 was an easy way to make money. You sold for over 
3 two-and-a-half years for an income to support your habit. 
4 And I appreciate the fact that you were honest with AP&P 
5 when you did tell them that, but that's a lot of sales over 
6 that point in time, a lot of distribution. That's a lot of 
7 lives affected by this terrible drug, as Mr. Breeze has so 
8 eloquently pointed out. 
9 In your own statements to AP&P you were using a half to 
10 one ounce per week, using and selling. And that is a lot of 
11 drugs over two-and-a-half years of this terrible drug being 
12 distributed through this community. 
13 I have looked at and weighed very carefully, is there 
14 any other thing I can look at besides prison? Yes, there 
15 are things I could look at. But you need to understand that 
16 my job is to weigh not only punishment to you, but also 
17 deterrence to you for the future. And I think that you're 
18 well on the way for yourself as far as controlling this 
19 habit, but you need more than just walking away cold turkey. 
20 Then there is also general deterrence which needs to be 
21 looked at as far as not allowing distribution of 
22 methamphetamine in this community. 
23 Based upon that I am going to follow --Mr. Breeze has 
24 made an excellent, eloquent argument, but I want you to 
25 understand my decision here today is based after a lot of 
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1 deliberation, trying to figure out what's best for you and 
2 what's best for this community. I am going to follow the 
3 recommendation. I am sentencing to you five years to life 
4 in the Utah State prison. 
5 Now, let me tell you what I'm going to do. I'm going 
6 to write a letter to the parole board and I'm going to point 
7 out to them certain things as far as what has been presented 
8 here today and in the presentence report. I'm going to 
9 encourage them to look at various programs that may be 
10 available as far as an early release into a halfway house, a 
11 treatment center, that type of thing. 
12 I will do that because I think, based upon the fact 
13 that you were cooperative, you do have family support; but I 
14 just cannot allow this to continue in this community. The 
15 one way I can stop it -- I don't know if I'll ever be able 
16 to stop it. I don't know if we can ever stop the flow of 
17 this terrible drug, but I'll do what I can. One way is 
18 to -- the message needs to be sent that it won't happen. It 
19 won't be allowed. 
20 So you are sentenced to five years to life in the Utah 
21 State Prison, I will write that letter within the next week 
22 to the parole board. I'll send a copy to Mr. Breeze to get 
23 a copy to you. 
24 At this point in time there's not going to be any fine 
25 incurred or assessed at this point. 
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Let me just indicate to you, Ms. Corinne, don't give up 
hope. There's some wonderful programs down at the state 
prison as far as drug and alcohol treatment. There's 
programs available to you for education. You can get your 
college degree down there over the internet and over 
satellite. Take advantage of those opportunities. The 
parole board will look at those as far as what release they 
give to you. But it's all up to you, as far as what you 
take advantage of down there. 
Any questions? 
MR. BREEZE: I don't suppose Your Honor would 
consider imposing this as a one to 15? That would give the 
Board plenty of discretion to either --if she does 
extremely well, to act on the low end; and if she doesn't do 
well to act on the high end. 
THE COURT: Any argument on that? 
MR. WARD: The state is opposed to a 76-3-402 
motion for all the reasons I made in my argument. 
THE COURT: Give the facts and circumstances as 
I've reviewed the report and the case, I will deny that 
motion. 
MR. BREEZE: Very well, Your Honor. 
(Hearing concluded.) 
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1 THE CLERK: Case number 001100222, State of Utah 
2 versus Corinne Skidmore. Counsel, please state your names 
3 for the record. 
4 MR. WARD: Bruce Ward for the state. 
5 MR. BREEZE: Robert Breeze for Ms. Skidmore, Your 
6 Honor. 
7 THE COURT: Good morning, Mr. Breeze, Mr. Ward. 
8 This is the time set for a pretrial conference. Have you 
9 I been able to resolve it? 
10 MR. BREEZE: Your Honor, they've made a plea offer 
11 I that we're willing to accept. 
12 THE COURT: All right. 
13 MR. BREEZE: So we're prepared to enter a plea at 
14 J this time. It would be a plea as charged. 
15 THE COURT: To a first degree felony? 
16 MR. BREEZE: That's correct, Your Honor. 
17 THE COURT: All right. Is that the plea agreement? 
18 MR. WARD: It is. 
19 J THE COURT: Mr. Breeze, have you reviewed with Ms. 
20 I Skidmore a plea --a statement by the defendant? 
21 MR. BREEZE: I have, Your Honor. I have one 
22 additional copy. 
2 3 THE COURT: All right. 
24 MR. BREEZE: I have the original here. 
2 5 THE COURT: Okay. I appreciate counsel doing this. 
1 I have a hard time getting local counsel to do a statement by 
2 defendant in advance of a plea and a plea agreement and 
3 certificate of counsel. I appreciate you taking care of this 
4 and doing it, Mr. Breeze. 
5 Ms. Skidmore, there's some questions I need to review 
6 with you. Even though you've sat down at length and visited 
7 with Mr. Breeze about your constitutional rights, there's 
8 some things I'm required to review with you by law. That's 
9 to make sure that your plea is done voluntarily, knowingly 
10 and intelligently. 
11 I Are you presently under the influence of any drugs or 
12 alcohol? 
13 MS. SKIDMORE: No. 
14 J THE COURT: Are you presently receiving any 
15 treatment for mental or physical illness? 
16 MS. SKIDMORE: No. 
17 THE COURT: Has anyone made any promises to you that 
18 are causing you to plead guilty? 
19 MS. SKIDMORE: No. 
2 0 THE COURT: Is anyone forcing you to plead guilty? 
21 MS. SKIDMORE: No. 
22 THE COURT: Are you pleading guilty because in fact 
23 you are guilty? 
24 MS. SKIDMORE: (No audible response.) 
25 THE COURT: Ms. Skidmore, you understand that when 
you do plead guilty you waive or you give up constitutional 
rights that you do have? Those constitutional rights are 
guaranteed to you under the United States constitution and 
the Utah State constitution. They are that first of all you 
have the right to have a trial. That could be a ]ury trial 
or it could be a trial to the court. It has to be a speedy 
trial, also, and you're giving up that right when you plead 
guilty. 
At the trial the state would need to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt each element of the charge. They would need 
to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that on March 7th, 2000, 
you did knowingly and intentionally possess methamphetamme, 
a controlled or counterfeit substance, with intent to 
distribute; and committed the offense within a thousand feet 
of a school. If they could not prove any one of those 
elements, then you'd be found not guilty. 
They have to prove beyond a reasonable doubt each element 
because under the constitution you are presumed innocent 
until they do so. You give up that presumption when you 
plead guilty. Also, you give up your right against 
self-incrimination. That means that nobody can force you to 
testify in court. It also means that when you do plead 
guilty you are incriminating yourself. 
You also give up your right to put on your own defense at 
a trial, to cross-examine and confront witness and to have 
4 
1 witnesses subpoenaed and compelled to come testify on your 
2 own behalf. And you give up your right to appeal any 
3 conviction from the court. Your appeals are very, very 
4 J limited after you end up entering a guilty plea. 
5 Do you understand that when you plead guilty, Ms. 
6 Skidmore, that you waive or give up all of those 
7 constitutional rights? 
8 MS. SKIDMORE: (No verbal response.) 
9 THE COURT: Do you understand that? 
10 MS. SKIDMORE: Yes. 
11 THE COURT: Okay. Now, do you have any other 
12 I questions that you want to ask Mr. Breeze or cover with Mr. 
13 J Breeze before I take your plea? 
14 MS. SKIDMORE: No. 
15 THE COURT: If there's anything else now is the time 
16 J to talk with Mr. Breeze. If you have any questions or issues 
17 I you want to review with him, you need to bring it up now. 
18 I It's just if you have any. I'm not asking you to make any 
19 up. 
20 All right. You need to understand, Ms. Skidmore, that 
21 you're pleading guilty to a first degree felony. The maximum 
22 penalty that could be imposed is five years to life in the 
23 Utah State Prison plus a fine of $10,000 and an 85 percent 
24 surcharge. Do you understand that that is the maximum 
25 penalty that could be imposed in this case? 
1 MS. SKIDMORE: Yes. 
2 THE COURT: All right. Mr. Ward, would you briefly 
3 state a factual basis for this plea? 
4 MR. WARD: Your Honor, on the date alleged in the 
5 information, in Cache County, state of Utah, a no-knock 
6 search warrant was served on Ms. Skidmore's residence in 
7 Lewiston. She indicated, when the officers entered the home, 
8 that she just came from a house where she'd taken drugs. 
9 Asked if she would show where the drugs were in the house she 
10 stated that she would. She took the officers to a strong 
11 box. There were two plastic containers. One contained a 
12 large rock of crank or methamphetamine; the other a large 
13 amount of crystal meth. There were plastic scales, syringes, 
14 a tourniquet, spoon, glass pipe, straws and numerous plastic 
15 baggies and envelopes. Also seized were $1,580 from a gray 
16 metal cash box and $2 06 from her day planner. 
17 J This residence is one house away from the Lewiston 
18 elementary school. 
19 The drugs that were seized were sent to the crime lab. 
20 9.5 grams of methamphetamine were found in the red plastic 
21 container and 10.3 grams in the black plastic container. 
22 Those constituted an amount substantially in excess of what 
23 is normal for personal use. 
24 THE COURT: Mr. Breeze, any other facts that need to 
2 5 be added that you know of? 
MR. BREEZE: Just that the --it was pursuant to a 
search warrant. They had done a garbage grab and had 
searched the garbage that was on the street and found 
syringes and other evidence. 
THE COURT: Thank you. Ms. Skidmore, before I take 
your plea I also need to inform you that after I've taken 
your plea, if you so desire to withdraw your guilty plea, the 
only way you can do that is by filing a written motion with 
the court within 30 days from today's date. You must show 
good cause why it should be withdrawn and the court would 
have to find good cause to withdraw it. 
All right. As to the charge of possession of a 
controlled substance with intent to distribute in a drug free 
zone, a first degree felony, arising on or about March 7th, 
2000, how do you plead, not guilty or guilty? 
MS. SKIDMORE: Guilty. 
THE COURT: I will accept your guilty plea. I do 
find that it is freely, voluntarily, knowingly and 
intelligently made. The record should reflect that Mr. 
Breeze is having Ms. Skidmore sign the statement of defendant 
in advance of plea, plea agreement and certificate of counsel 
and order. 
MR. BREEZE: Mr. Ward and I have both signed. 
THE COURT: I'll have this copy returned to you, 
Mr. Breeze. 
n 
1 MR. WARD: Your Honor, the state would move to have 
2 count two, the drug paraphernalia charge, dismissed 3 0 days 
3 after sentencing. 
4 THE COURT: On the amended information there is no 
5 count two. 
6 MR. WARD: If I filed an amended -- I wasn't aware 
7 that I had. 
8 THE COURT: There is an amended information and it 
9 J only has one count. 
10 MR. WARD: Very well. 
11 THE COURT: Ms. Skidmore and Mr. Breeze have signed 
12 the statement of plea. I will also go ahead and sign the 
13 order. 
14 All right. Since this is a felony case, I'm going to 
15 order a presentence report be prepared and submitted to the 
16 court. What that means, Ms. Skidmore, is that you will be 
17 given a referral to go see Adult Probation and Parole. That 
18 J has their address on it. You need to get right over and see 
19 I them to begin that process of preparing the report. 
20 They'll prepare the report and send a copy to Mr. Breeze 
21 and to Mr. Ward prior to sentencing. You'll have a chance to 
22 visit with Mr. Breeze and talk about and review the report 
23 with him. We will set sentencing for July 25th. 
24 MR. BREEZE: That's fine. What time would that be? 
25 THE COURT: That will be at 9 a.m. That's when 
1 you'll need to be back in court, Ms. Skidmore. If you're not 
2 J a bench warrant will issue for your arrest. Do you 
3 I understand that? 
4 MS. SKIDMORE: (No audible response.) 
5 THE COURT: Any other issues, Mr. Breeze or Mr. 
6 Ward? 
7 MR. BREEZE: No, Your Honor. 
8 MR. WARD: No. 
9 I THE COURT: Thank you. 
10 
11 | (Hearing concluded.) 
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C E R T I F I C A T E 
THIS IS TO CERTIFY that the audio taped hearing was 
transcribed by me, Rodney M. Felshaw, a Certified Court 
Reporter and Certified Court Tape Transcriber in and for the 
State of Utah, residing at Brigham City, Utah. 
That a full, true and correct transcription of the 
hearing, to the best of my ability, is set forth in the pages 
numbered 2 to 9, inclusive. 
I further certify that the original transcript was 
filed with the Court Clerk, First District Court, Cache 
County, Logan, Utah. 
I also certify that I am not associated with any 
of the parties to said matter and that I am not interested 
in the event thereof. 
Witness my hand this 11th day of Apirl, 2 001. 
Rodney MY Felshaw, C.S.R., R.P.R, 
